At the 2026 NPT Review Conference (27 April - 22 May), States parties will examine the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 2022, noting that, despite intensive consultations, the 2015 Review Conference and the 2022 Review Conference were not able to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document.
š¬š§ United Kingdom, šØš³ China, šŗšø United States, š·šŗ Russian Federation, šÆšµ Japan, š¦šŗ Australia, šµš± Poland, šØšæ Czechia, š©šŖ Germany, š§š Bahrain, š¦šŖ United Arab Emirates, š®š· Islamic Republic of Iran
Thank you, Mr. President. I am taking the floor to exercise our right of reply to comments made in this session by the delegations of Iran, China, and the Russian Federation. We completely reject the assertion by Iran that the United Kingdom is engaged in a nuclear arms race. The UK maintains a minimum, credible deterrent with the smallest nuclear arsenal of all nuclear weapon states. Our declared stockpile figure is a ceiling, not a target. We also seek to make progress towards a world free of nuclear weapons by engaging on a range of initiatives on transparency, irreversibility, and verification. Iran and others have mentioned NATO's extended deterrence arrangements. We recognize there are concerns amongst states' parties. Indeed, we engage actively in dialogue with several partners on this issue. But, Mr President, it is important that we do so on the basis of fact. These arrangements have always been fully consistent with the NPT. Indeed, they predate the NPT and were fully understood by states' parties at the time of its negotiation. Allies have always complied with their obligations under the treaty. NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements have been key in preventing proliferation, providing assurance to allies that they do not need nuclear weapons of their own, and therefore supporting one of the NPT's core objectives. Turning to the ludicrous comments from the delegation of Russia, the UK and France are not providing, and would never provide, nuclear weapons or related capabilities to Ukraine, as we stated at the UN Security Council in February. This is yet another piece of disinformation from Russia and a transparent attempt to deflect attention from its ongoing, unprovoked, and illegal full scale invasion of Ukraine. We remain fully committed to our obligations under the NPT and to preventing the proliferation of nuclear weapons. Thank you, Mr. President.
Thank you, President. The US delegation over the past two days deliberately misinterpreted China's positions and proposals, and distorted and smeared China's nuclear doctrine and the development of China's national defense forces. China categorically rejected these claims. Regarding China's nuclear doctrine and our efforts in nuclear arms control, we have already elaborated in detail in our previous statements and will not repeat them here. China would like to make the following additional points in response. First, the US proposal of the so called multilateral nuclear arms control and strategic stability talks has far more elements of political posturing than of serious dialogue. The proposal is based on the erroneous narratives such as the so called the three major nuclear weapon states and China's nuclear threat, attempting to overturn the global nuclear disarmament consensus. And to revive in a disguised form the false narrative of China-US-Russia trilateral nuclear arms control talks. It is in essence an attempt to find an excuse to deflect its own special and primary responsibility for nuclear disarmament. It is disarmament in name, rearmament in practice. China would not accept any hypocritical approach that calls for dialogue in words but pursues confrontation in actions. Secondly, the United States is the single greatest source of disruption in the field of nuclear arms control and strategic stability. Over the past two decades, the US has successfully withdrawn from the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, and the Open Skies Treaty, and has allowed a new start to lapse without extension, continuously undermining international security and the global nuclear arms control regime. Obsessed with strengthening its monopoly advantage in nuclear capabilities, the US invests nearly a hundred billion dollars each year in nuclear force modernization. It refuses to renounce a policy of first use of nuclear weapons and through arrangements such as nuclear sharing and extended deterrence seeks to build a so-called nuclear alliance. The US has also promoted the Golden Dome Missile Defenses Program and deployed strategic offensive and defensive capabilities in close proximity to other nuclear weapon states. This series of negative actions by the US has gravely damaged global and regional strategic stability. increased the risks of nuclear confrontation and nuclear conflict and fueled a new nuclear arms race. Third, the US should give a positive response to the legitimate concerns of the international community. If the US delegates expectation yesterday of working towards a solution that mutually improves the current security environment is genuine, Then, can we ask the US to first seriously consider and respond to China's proposals? China calls on the US to engage as early as possible in negotiations on the conclusion of a treaty among nuclear weapon states on neutral no first use of nuclear weapons and to participate as soon as possible in negotiations on intern on the international legal binding instrument on negative security assurances for non nuclear weapon states. China also urges the US to seriously consider the proposal put forward by Russia and to address in a response manner the follow up arrangements concerning the expiration of the new start. Finally, and most importantly, China calls on the United States to earnestly abide by the purposes and principles of the Yuan Charter, and to abandon her Germanic practices of arbitrarily using or threatening the use of force in international relations. I also take note of the high frequency of the use of the word free uh sincerity. Good faith. Well, the international community should have formed a clear understanding of their good faith. Over the past two years, the conduct of the US during diplomatic negotiations with the non NPT non nuclear weapon state party has in effect given the term good faith a new definition. Thank you, President. Yeah.
President, I take the floor to respond to several previous speakers, including the remarks made today about U.S. military action in Iran. However, before I do so, I would like to take a moment to respond to my Russian and Chinese colleagues, particularly China, which used it in t essentially the entire duration of its national report in an unfounded seven and a half minute tirade against the United States, followed by another five minutes reply just a few minutes ago. Unlike them, I will not engage in a lengthy list of grievances at this time. To them, I say only it is not the United States that is refusing to engage on strategic stability and arms control. It is not the United States that is refusing to provide transparency. Instead, as I said yesterday, it is the United States that has extended the offer to meet, in good faith, and try to make actual progress on Article VI, not simply use the majority of its own national statement to levy accusations against others. I will not repeat all the arguments I made yesterday in this regard, but to the countries in this room I will simply say you heard me then and you heard Russia and China today. I will ask you which of us is actually, to quote my Chinese colleague, placing its own self interest above arms control, and which one of us is offering to engage. As I noted on Monday, on February twenty eighth, the United States began an operation to protect the American people, U.S. forces, and partners against threats posed by a regime that has for decades undermined US and international security. Our actions were directed at military and strategic assets tied to specific threats. The United States continues to take seriously and observe fully its obligations to avoid targeting personnel and facilities in Iran, including technical personnel and facilities that are entitled to the protections afforded to civilians and civilian objects under the Geneva Conventions and customary international law. Meanwhile, Tehran's indiscriminate attacks on neighboring states and civilian objects underscored this regime's threats to international peace and security. Concurrent with these operations, the United States engaged in direct and indirect dialogue with Iranian counterparts to negotiate a ceasefire to test whether we could work constructively toward it in an enduring diplomatic resolution. These diplomatic efforts remain underway. The United States continues to seek a strong deal that would advance regional peace and stability and in which Iran would forego its domestic nuclear enrichment program. We have thus far not succeeded, primarily because Iran has refused to commit to the responsible path. Today we heard Iran assert a supposed, quote, inalienable right, end quote, to enrichment. To be clear, no such right exists. On Monday, the representative of the UAE noted that Iran wants all of the rights of the treaty and none of the obligations. I will go one step farther today. Iran is claiming imaginary rights while outright rejecting its clear, unambiguous obligations. It is true that the MPT guarantees the right to peaceful uses of nuclear energy in conformity with obligations under Articles one and two of the treaty. However, the treaty does not expressly grant Iran or any other country an inalienable right to enrich. Iran can realize its Article IV rights without enrichment. Furthermore, pursuant to the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1737, Iran is currently legally obliged to suspend enrichment related activities. If Iran wants to fully exercise its Article IV rights, it must also fully implement its obligations under Articles II and III, and as well as its obligations under relevant Security Council resolutions. For too long, Iran's willful noncompliance and continued advancement of nuclear capabilities have posed a direct threat to the United States, our partners, and the nonproliferation regime itself. There is a path forward, but Iran must make the right choices. We ask again this body to join us in urging Iran loudly and resolutely to engage constructively with us. Thank you, President.
Thank you, Mr. President. We have asked for the floor in exercise of our right to reply in connection with the situation that has emerged in this room over the last three days. Instead of immediately after addressing all procedural matters, Beginning to consider relevant issues related to strengthening the global nuclear nonproliferation regime. We have, for six meetings now, been forced to listen to statements by the representatives of the collective West that are either partially or in some cases almost fully focused on unjustified, politicized, and absolutely false anti Russian attacks. And Their aggressive tone towards our country and the rhetoric of those statements together exceeds what was used to justify the inhumane actions of NATO member states against Yugoslavia, against Iraq, against Libya in 2011, and now against Iran. Mr. President, everything that we're seeing in the hall. Shows that the Collective West has once again, as represented by a number of states, organized a broad, well-orchestrated political campaign against Russia. Most of the states that have made unjustified anti Russian statements are member NATO member states. An alliance that is most hostile to Russia and other member states that are protecting their sovereignty and international affairs. These states are abusing delegations' attention. And their times, which is always uh valuable and lacking, have brought elements of a hybrid war that they're waging against our country for more than 10 years to this review conference. This situation is not a new one for us. We saw a similar situation at the 10th NPT Review Conference as well as during the three sessions of the preparatory committee for this conference. These Political actions on the part of states that claim to be protecting the NPT in the review process are particularly cynical and glaring. And they are particularly cynical because this is happening during one of the main events in the area of disarmament, nonproliferation, the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, when the fate of the main and essentially only treaty of its kind is at stake, an element that is a load bearing uh treaty as a load bearing element of the international security system. In connection with the statements made by our opponents, it would be justified to ask the question of what goal these countries came to the conference with. We have the persistent impression that their main goal, their main purpose for coming to this format and participating in this conference is to use the NPT platform to settle political scores. Mr. President, that was the introductory part of my statement. Because more than 50, and we counted, more than 50 anti-Russian statements were made. We believe that we have the right to ask for additional time for our right of reply. We must once again provide additional clarifications on those issues or problems that were raised in the statements of our. Opponents and foes, and which in their interpretation were presented as violations committed by the Russian Federation. I'll begin with the Budapest memorandum, which was an element of a package agreement in the form of a political declaration that placed equal obligations on all parties, and Russia complied unfailingly with those documents.
Thank you Mr. President. Since the end of World War, Japan has consistently contributed to international peace and prosperity, and this remains unchanged. Japan, as a staunch supporter of the NPT, has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This of course includes compliance with its own obligations under the NPT. And Japan continues its cooperation with the IAEA in a transparent manner. The Government of Japan observes the three non-nuclear principles as policy guidelines. Under these principles, the introduction of nuclear weapons is not permitted. Japan has been limiting its research, development, and use of nuclear energy exclusively for peaceful purposes under the Atomic Energy Basic Act. All nuclear materials in Japan, including plutonium, are subject to the exceptionally stringent IAE safeguards, and the IAEA has been drawing the conclusion that all materials remain in peaceful activities. Therefore, there are no issues in relation to non proliferation. Japan also continues to uphold the principle of not possessing plutonium without specific purposes. Japan has declared the policy to reduce the amount of its plutonium stockpile in twenty eighteen, and the amount has decreased since then. Under this policy, Japan will continue to take appropriate measures. Moreover, as our own voluntary measures, Japan has secured transparency of its nuclear material through its efforts such as publishing information on its plutonia management, which is more detailed than the one required in the international guidelines. Japan, as the only country to have ever suffered atomic bombings in war, will continue to work closely with the international community to realize a world without nuclear weapons. We will continue to advance realistic and practical efforts to maintain and strengthen the NPT regime. Thank you, Mr. President.
I take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to address some misleading assertions which have been made in the preceding debate regarding Australia's naval nuclear propulsion programme. Australia's Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program is proceeding in full compliance with AUKUS partners' respective international obligations. Including under the MPT, Australia's Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and Additional Protocol, and Australia's obligations under the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty. Naval nuclear propulsion was foreseen by the drafters of the MPT and remains aligned with the treaty. As the Director General of the IAEA has repeatedly made clear. Article 14 of the IAEA's Model CSA is the specific provision acknowledging CSA states' ability to use nuclear material in naval nuclear propulsion within the legal framework for safeguards implementation. Australia is continuing its engagement with the IAEA to develop a safeguards and verification approach for its NNP program within the framework of Australia's CSA and AP, including an Article 14 arrangement. As we have made clear, Australia's Article 14 arrangement will not remove nuclear material from IAEA oversight. Australia's conventionally armed, nuclear powered submarine program will be subject to a robust package of safeguards and verification measures, enabling the agency to continue to fulfill its technical safeguards objectives for Australia at all stages of the submarine's life cycle. The IAEA has the clear authority under its statute to negotiate directly and in confidence with individual member states on the establishment and application of safeguards and verification arrangements. We hope all delegations will continue to reject any effort to undermine the independent technical authority of the IAEA and its mandate to engage with states on implementation of their own safeguards arrangements. The technical mandate of the IAEA is critical to the non-proliferation regime and something we as NPT parties should all strive to uphold. President, consistent with our commitment to transparency, Australia, the UK, and the US will host a side event on Friday, 8 May, to update the international community on AUKUS Partners' approach to preserving the integrity of and strengthening its nuclear nonproliferation regime through our work with the IAEA. The event will provide an overview of recent developments, including the release of a working paper for the MPT RevCon and the IAEA Director General's November 2025 report on Australia's Naval Nuclear Propulsion Program. All MPT member states are warmly invited to attend. I thank you, President.
Thank you, Mr. President. I would like to briefly respond to the criticism against NATO deterrence policy, in particular against NATO nuclear sharing arrangements. I would like to start by supporting the remarks by the UK Ambassador. NATO's nuclear arrangements are fully consistent with the NPT. They were established before the entry into force of the NPT and since then have operated in a manner that fully respects both the letter and the spirit of the treaty. There is nothing illegal about NATO's nuclear policy. Full stop. Recent attempts to politicize this issue within the framework of the NPT should be seen for what they are a distraction from the most serious proliferation and security challenges of today, including Russia's illegal invasion of Ukraine, its reckless nuclear rhetoric and irresponsible behavior, as well as the opaque nuclear buildup by China. These actions are destabilizing in contrast with the strictly defensive and responsible NATO nuclear policy. NATO does not seek confrontation, nor does it lower the threshold for nuclear use. Any increase in the salience of deterrence must be understood in its proper context. It is a direct response to Russia's aggressive and revisionist policies, its repeated nuclear threats, and its attempt to undermine the European security order by force. Thank you, Mr. President.
Excellency. Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, having listened to the statement delivered today by the Islamic Republic of Iran, and in particular its egregious invocation of the so called Nazi big lie in relation to the State of Israel, the Czech Republic, as a country that endured the brutality of Nazi occupation during the Second World War, cannot and will not remain silent. In our view, the statement delivered by the Iranian delegation runs counter to the purposes of the United Nations, as clearly a reference in the preamble to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. In these circumstances, the Czech Republic wishes to express its serious doubts as to how the Iranian Vice President can properly exercise the functions of this important office. That is why the Czech Republic fully subscribes to the statements of those Member States that have dissociated themselves from the consensus on this appointment. I thank you, Mr. President. Yeah.
Mr. President, after having carefully listened to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran, the E three, namely France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, strongly reject the accusations of Iran against the E three. France, Germany, and the United Kingdom firmly stand by the NPT. We have never contested the right to the peaceful use of nuclear energy enshrined in Article IV of the Treaty, and have indeed supported the access of NPT states' parties to peaceful uses through cooperation and supporting the IAA's respective programs. But the NPT is not a treaty to pick and choose from. It establishes a unique, legally binding global safeguards architecture that all states parties must adhere to. Contrary to what the Iranian representative has claimed, Iran has a long history of insufficient cooperation with the IEA on safeguards matters, as confirmed by subsequent IEA reports over a period of more than 20 years. In june twenty twenty-five, the IAA Board of Governors, based upon a report by the Director-General, found Iran non-compliant with its legally binding NPT safeguards obligations. Since then, instead of returning to full compliance with its obligations, Iran has not provided the IEA with any of the legally required reports on its nuclear program, including nuclear accountancy reports and design information, nor provided IEA access to confirm the non diversion of nuclear material. The verification of Iran's enriched uranium stockpile, including of about 440 kilograms of high enriched uranium, is long overdue and the agency has lost continuity of knowledge in relation to Iran's stockpile. As a result, the IEA is not in a position to confirm that Iran's nuclear program is exclusively peaceful. The E3 urge Iran to return to full compliance with its legally binding safeguards obligations without further delay and to address the international community's grave concerns regarding its nuclear program. The E3 remain committed to resolve the concerns about Iran's nuclear programs through a negotiated solution. President, in my own national capacity, I would like to correct the following two points. First, NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements have been and continue to be fully consistent with the NPT and were put in place well before the NPT entered into force in nineteen seventy. They did not stand in the way of major disarmament achievements like SALT, INF or New START, and they will certainly not stand in the way of further agreements. To the contrary, extended nuclear deterrence prevented non-nuclear weapon states from developing their own nuclear weapons. Second, we categorically refute any false accusations of Germany advocating for the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Germany has constantly reaffirmed its commitment to the NPT as a non nuclear weapon state. Just as our State Secretary did confirm here yesterday. Thank you.
Cloy Mr. President, on behalf of several GCC countries, namely the United Arab Emirates, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the State of Qatar, and the State of Kuwait and my country, the Kingdom of Bahrain, I uh find myself compelled to respond to the representative of Iran. The claims we heard have no legal or factual basis. These claims represent a direct attempt to mislead. In this context, we reiterate that these allegations run contrary to the facts on the ground. In fact, Iran's recent practices have included direct attacks on our countries and civilian infrastructure as well as critical waterways. This poses a dangerous threat to the freedom of navigation and the global economy. We categorically reject Iran's attempts to uh d to characterize the current status as a result of other root causes, and flagrant uh uh overlooking of the fact that this uh attack wa the that this crisis started by direct attacks against our countries that are not party to the conflict. This is a flagrant violation of the Charter of the United Nations and international law. Mr. President. Claiming that these Iranian measures are self defense uh are not realistic and are not factual. Iran has targeted our countries that are not parties to the conflict, and these attacks cannot be justified under Article fifty one of the Charter. These acts are not precautionary measures and not preemptive measures, these acts are illegal. And unlawful. In this context, we reiterate that the international community made a clear position as reflected in Security Council Resolution 2817, which was supported by 136 states. This resolution condemned these attacks and called for their immediate cessation. The resolution said that these attacks were a flag in violation of international law and pose a dangerous threat to international and regional peace and security. We reject claims that our countries of the region are responsible. We reject claims about the use of our territories for military attacks. We reiterate that these allegations are not based on our baselist and are part of repeated attempts to mislead the international community and to shift blame to other parties. At the same time, we reiterate. That we remain fully committed to the principles of good neighborness and non-interference in the internal affairs of state. We will continue to respect the principle of state sovereignty and territorial integrity. But what we are seeing from Iran runs counter to this to these principles. Calls for diplomatic solutions are not credible, as we heard from Iran. These must be complemented and coupled with a lasting cessation of hostilities and full commitment to international principles and transparent cooperation with the IAA in order to maintain the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. In conclusion, Mr. President, we reiterate that the current attacks are not the result of conflicting narratives, but a real test to the international community to maintain international peace and security and promote respect of international law. Thank you.
Mr. President, I regret that I have to take the floor again, yet Iran has chosen to misuse this conference by spreading a false narrative, distorting the facts, and making unfounded allegations against my country. It is therefore necessary to set the record straight. The UAE strongly rejects the baseless allegation made by Iran. The UAE is a not party to the armed conflict. It is a fact that on 28 February, Iran began attacking its neighbors, including the UAE, that are not party to the conflict. Iran has launched thousands of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones towards the UAE, with 90% of these heinous attacks deliberately and indiscriminately targeting civilian infrastructure. The UAE has not permitted the use of its territory, including its airspace. Or territorial waters for the planning, preparation, equipping, launching, or carrying out of a hostile military operation against any state, including Iran. Iran's allegation is false, it is reckless, and is a blatant attempt to divert attention from Iran's own unjustifiable conduct. The UAE's position has been clear and consistent. We are committed to upholding international law, including the Charter of the United Nations, to good neighborliness and to de escalation. Mr. President, Iran has failed to meet its safeguard obligation. Iran has obstructed the work of the IAAEA. Iran has failed to provide the transparency required of every responsible state party to the MPT. And Iran continues to act in a manner that threatens regional and international security. If Iran's new crane program is exclusively peaceful, as they claim, then Iran should answer a simple question why is Iran enriching Iranian to 60%? There is no credible civilian justification for such enrichment. Mr. President, Iran appears not to have listened carefully to the statement delivered by many delegations in this conference. Those statements reflect serious and persistent concern regarding Iran's nuclear program, its safeguard failures, and its lack of transparency. Iran should also not misread the position of the wider international community. The international community has repeatedly condemned Iran. Iran's destabilizing behavior on various international fora. Security Council Resolution 2817 condemned Iran's attack against the UAE and other countries in the region and was co sponsored by a record number of 136 member states. The message is clear. The world is not blind to Iran's conduct, the world is not silent, and the world is not persuaded by Iran's rhetoric. I thank you.
Š ŃŠ¾ Š²ŃŠ½? Thank you, Mr President. After the coup d'etat in twenty fourteen, the Budapest memorandum once and for all lost its relevance as a political document. After this, after the coup, an active or uh and the formation out of Ukraine of an aggressive opponent to Russia began. This created a real threat to the security of our country, which we were not able to ignore. Thus, in 1994, the the agreement of that year was undermined by the destabilizing course to expand NATO, including with Ukraine, to the detriment of the fundamental security interests of Russia. This fundamentally contradicts the content of the Budapest package of documents. We believe it necessary to refute the unfounded speculation over the fact that Russia is allegedly considering the possibility of the use of a nuclear weapon in Ukraine or threatening its use. It is clear that this is being done intentionally to ratchet up anti-Russian hysteria. Based on the joint statement of the five nuclear powers from January twenty twenty two, Russia is making efforts to prevent any military confrontation between nuclear opponents because it could lead to a nuclear level escalation. Russia is in is is not interested in escalating tensions. Our interests are for nuclear weapons to never be uh used. That is the essence of Russia's warning about the possible consequences of direct aggression by NATO countries against our country in the context of the Ukrainian crisis. As for um um Russia's suspension of its participation in um the New Star Treaty, everything was done to undermine our national participation, which directly contradicts the um preamble of the New START Treaty, the fundamental principle therein uh upon which that treaty was was was was founded. There was a fundamental change in the situation compared with the situation that existed at the time when that treaty was concluded was was concluded, which led to the suspension of the effect of the treaty. Moreover, before the suspension of the New START treaty, Washington was significantly violating the central provision of that document about uh qualitative restrictions and limitations on existing uh arms. This uh these are only two reasons why. The uh effect of the treaty was suspended and before uh the fifth of February this year when that happened, the President of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, in September 2025, uh proposed another initiative to uh exercise restraint in the nuclear sphere. Specifically, he proposed that Russia and the United States um adhere to the um new start limits on strategic armaments for a year after the expiration of the treaty's effect. Yeah.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.