At the 2026 NPT Review Conference (27 April - 22 May), States parties will examine the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 2022, noting that, despite intensive consultations, the 2015 Review Conference and the 2022 Review Conference were not able to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document.
🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇫🇷 France, 🇺🇸 United States, 🇮🇷 Islamic Republic of Iran, 🇩🇪 Germany, 🇨🇳 China, 🇿🇦 South Africa
Thank you, President. The Russian Federation has asked for the floor in exercise of the right of reply. In connection with the statements that were heard today in this room, at the meeting of Main Committee One, we have heard many baseless accusations against our country now. A particular focus on placed on Russia's alleged undermining of the fundamental foundations of the NPT, allegedly by creating a nuclear threat and using aggressive nuclear rhetoric. In this context, European countries, especially NATO members. Tried to convey my message that their blocks is serving the mission of peace, is purely defensive as nature, and contributes to strengthening the NPT. It is time to shed light on what is actually true. The defensive nature of NATO has long been a myth. This was a result of NATO's aggression on Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and its moral support. To the reckless anti-Iranian campaign carried out by Israel and the US. Now, about strengthening the NPT. Currently, the US, France, and the UK have begun reviewing and r rethinking positive achievements in nuclear disarmament that have been achieved over the last 15 years. As for the UK and France, their nuclear ambitions are the logical and predictable continuation of London and Paris long term course. Aimed at avoiding joining agreements on nuclear arms control. Disregarding the NPT, the nuclear power, three nuclear powers of the West are expanding and building up their nuclear arsenals without limits and are involving their non-nuclear partners into ever more destabilizing nuclear umbrella schemes. Under France's initiative, for example, the concept of forward deterrence is being implemented. This, together with a long standing practice of nuclear sharing arrangements, is meant to strengthen the nuclear fist pointed against Russia and its allies. Additionally In the EU, discussions are underway about the possibility of creating their own European nuclear military capabilities. A number of non-nuclear weapon states in Europe are toying with the idea of obtaining nuclear weapons or serving as a recipient of this type of WMDs. All of these actions are causing direct and clear damage to the regime underpinned by the NPT. And now a couple of words about threats. Over the last 20 years. NATO has been building up its cup force capacities in order to exert firm pressure on countries they find undesirable. For this, the collective West has for decades been expanding its military unions and coalitions. When it comes to Europe, we have seen wave upon wave of harmful NATO expansion right up to Russia's borders, which posed a spreading geopolitical c w which should cons constituted geopolitical aggression. From the point of view of Russia's security interests, it is fundamental that NATO states considered and continued to consider our country, country, as an opponent. As a result of the West destructive actions, we have seen a profound deterioration of the relationship between the five permanent members of the Security Council, who are also the de URA nuclear powers, and bear particular responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. This has led to an increase in strategic risks, which could lead to direct military confrontation between the P5 and accordingly potentially catastrophic consequences for humankind in its entirety. The Ukrainian crisis continues to escalate. However, most European states Continue to pursue their highly hostile course against Russia, continue to use provocative rhetoric and look for new ways to cause damage to Russia through the hands of the Kiev regime and continue to plan dangerous ventures. At the same time, there is an intensive remilitarization of Europe, including attempts to give the Ukrainian regime deadly weapons. As for Of sol settling the Ukrainian crisis, the solution lies in NATO members abandoning their attempts to deal a strategic defeat to Russia and undermine our core interests. Thank you.
Monsieur le président. Chair. I wish to respond to the various statements made regarding France's policy on nuclear deterrence. France is a responsible nuclear weapon state. It attaches the utmost importance. To compliance with the January 3rd, 2022 P5 declaration and calls on all nuclear weapon states to demonstrate the level of responsibility expected from states possessing nuclear weapons. The President of the Republic reaffirmed this at Ilong on March 2nd. France's nuclear deterrence is strictly defensive in nature. The President of the Republic also underscored unambiguously that France. Has no intention of entering into any arms race, nor of adopting a logic of parity with other nuclear weapon states. France has always set the size of its arsenal at levels strictly consistent with the operational effectiveness of its deterrence. The measures announced by France cannot be compared with those taken by other nuclear weapon states. I will recall them here. The complete dismantlement of our land-to-land nuclear component, the now irreversible dismantlement of facilities for the production of fissile material for weapons, the cessation of nuclear testing, and the complete, transparent, and irreversible dismantlement of the Pacific nuclear test site. At the same time, one must acknowledge the reality of the profound deterioration of the strategic environment, the war waged by Russia on European soil. The expansion and diversification of Russia's and China's arsenals, and the deepening of proliferation crises requires to adapt our model. It is in this context that the President of the Republic recalled, building on his previous addresses, that France's vital interests have a European dimension. France has therefore proposed to certain partners the progressive establishment of a forward deterrence arrangement aimed at deepening bilateral cooperation and achieving genuine strategic convergence between our countries. Forward deterrence entails no sharing of the ultimate decision, nor of its planning or implementation. It involves no transfer of control over nuclear weapons and is therefore fully compatible. With the commitments of France and other states concerned under Articles 1 and 2 of the NPT. France continues to champion the goal of transparency. It has, in this regard, submitted a comprehensive national report on the implementation of its obligations. It supports the establishment of a dedicated interactive dialogue on the reports of all states' parties. France also remains engaged in the P5 dialogue on doctrines and risk reduction. In that context, we have supported the U.S. proposal to launch discussions on strategic stability. And our minister recalled this at the opening of this conference. Chair, allow me finally to recall that these efforts, in France's view, can only be pursued within the framework of the NPT. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons offers none of the guarantees that would allow to move forward to a world without nuclear weapons. It counts no nuclear weapon states among its states parties, nor does it have a credible verification regime. It cannot in any respect be regarded as an effective disarmament instrument within the meaning of Article VI. France did not participate in the negotiations on that treaty and does not intend to accede to that treaty. It is not binding upon us and creates no new obligations for France. We reject any claims that it reflects or contributes in any way to uh to development of customary norm prohibiting nuclear weapons. Thank you.
Thank you, Chair. I take to the floor to respond to comments over the last few days. Once again, China spent almost the entirety of its main Committee One remarks talking about the United States. First, I would like to reiterate some key facts. These facts are not intended to politicize or hype the threat of any country, but merely to lay out the information. As recently detailed in Geneva and other forums, we are aware that China has conducted nuclear explosive tests. The People's Liberation Army sought to conceal testing by obfuscating nuclear explosions, which are inconsistent with its nuclear testing moratorium. China conducted one such yield producing nuclear test on June 22, 2020. The CTBTO Preparatory Commission initially issued a statement declaring that its IMS network could detect any test anywhere. I am happy and encouraged to see that Dr. Floyd and the CTBTO PrEPCOM have since acknowledged that there are limitations to that capability because it means that we can make progress. But this all comes back to one salient and undeniable fact. To realize a world with fewer nuclear weapons requires more than just one state to act with restraint, which is what some in this forum ask of the United States. Reciprocity and restraint is required for there to be mutual benefit and progress toward our ultimate goal. That is why we have proposed to Russia and China and among the P5 initial steps to address nuclear testing, among other proposals. Perhaps there is some sort of stepping stone measure that the five of us can take to increase the confidence in each other's behavior regarding nuclear explosive test monitoring, increasing the le the ability to detect low yield tests, and measures to ensure we all adhere to the same standard. Our sincere proposals must be met with good faith. We have already and will continue to engage nuclear weapon states to move forward on our shared Article VI obligations. It is on Russia and China to change their behavior and be willing to discuss how to instill confidence that they are adhering to their stated nuclear testing moratoria. If China does not adhere to a zero yield standard, then it must admit that and detail what its standard is. These concerning behaviors are not the actions of a country that wishes to be transparent about its activities. We are presenting China with an opportunity to enhance transparency and allay international concerns about its behavior. We hope Beijing chooses this this path. Other countries conducting yield producing tests while the United States does not could put the United States at an intolerable disadvantage, and I need to make this very clear. We will not negotiate from a position of weakness and unreciprocated restraint. I want to conclude here by reaffirming that the United States' goal is not to obtain comprehensive or numerical nuclear superiority over any other nuclear armed states. The United States has no intention of engaging in an arms race. Rather, I remain optimistic that our proposal for multilateral strategic stability and arms control talks offer a practical and realistic path forward to address these challenges. I'm encouraged to hear our Chinese colleagues stated support for transparency measures, but China hasn't provided any form of transparency, neither in terms of qualitative nor quantitative arsenal transparency. China did not host a national report side event that so many here have called for. China won't even acknowledge its well reported nuclear weapon buildup. It's time to turn these words into actions. I urge China and all of the states here today to support us in this endeavor. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. During the general debate this week, my delegation has spoken at length, both in our national statement and in several rights of reply, addressing and rejecting the baseless allegations directed against Iran's peaceful nuclear program. I will therefore not revisit those points and instead refer delegations to our previous interventions. However, I must note that the representatives of the US, United Kingdom, Germany, France, Continue to misuse every available platform, including Main Committee One, which is mandated to address nuclear disarmament, to advance politically motivated narratives. That committee should instead be the forum in which these estates respond to the concerns repeatedly raised by non nuclear weapon estates and civil society organizations, including during this morning's session, regarding their persistent failure to fulfill their obligations under Article 6 of the treaty. Turning to the specific remarks made by the United Kingdom also on behalf of the US and France, I must respond to the inaccurate and unlawful assertions concerning Security Council resolutions related to Iran's peaceful nuclear program. It must be stated clearly and categorically that the attempt by the E3 to invoke the so called snapback mechanism is legally unfounded, politically irresponsible, and procedurally abusive. Following the unilateral and unlawful withdrawal of the United States from the JCPOA in 2018, the E3 failed to uphold their commitments to preserve the agreement. In doing so, they lost any standing to invoke claims of significant non performance, particularly when Iran's subsequent measures were lawful, proportionate, and fully consistent with its rights under the JCPOA and Security Council Resolution 2020 22 31. Resolution twenty two thirty one reached its full and final termination on october eighteenth, twenty twenty five, exactly as stipulated in its timeline. This is not a matter of interpretation. It is explicitly set out in the resolution itself. The official record of the Security Council confirms that the E3 notification carries no legal effect, and any claim to revive previously terminated resolutions is null and void of an issue. Therefore, neither Iran nor any member of the international community is under any obligation to recognize or implement such unlawful measures. All nuclear related provisions and restrictions under Resolution twenty-two thirty-one expired definitively on october eighteenth, twenty twenty five, in full accordance with the timeline endorsed by the Security Council. I thank you, Mr. Chair.
Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. Chair, I'm obliged to react to the to the right of reply of the Russian Federation. I will not respond again to the to the false allegations regarding nuclear sharing. Rushia is best positioned to know that these arrangements are fully in line with the with the NPT. I would just like to recall where the actual crisis in armed control and the lack in disarmament has its origins. Germany the German government together with allies has seen a large increase in Russian capabilities, especially in crews and ballistic missiles, with ranges previously covered by the ENF Treaty. We have repeatedly called on Russia to refrain from developing and stationing these capabilities or reverse its course. Russia has not positively responded to this cause and has instead increased its production of these systems. Russia is not exclusively using these capabilities in its war against Ukraine and is consciously also putting European targets at risk with capabilities that are nuclear capable. It has repeatedly voiced threats to use this system against us or allies in Europe. The debates about the Terrands in Europe are a clear response to the Russian threat. War is back in Europe and we need to protect our population. Regarding the right of reply of Iran. I just would like to refer to the IAE report and our right of reply during the general debate. Thank you, Mr President.
Mr. Chair. Some countries in recent two days continue to misrepresent and distort China's nuclear policies and our stance on nuclear arms control, and we firmly reject these accusations. Just now the US Representative continues to hype the so called China's Low yield nuclear explosive tests. And these are very tired and very irresponsible remarks that we will not respond. China US accusations are completely unfounded and baseless and untenable. China has never conducted any. Activities in violation of the CTBT provisions. The CDBTO Preparatory Committee and the Technical Secretariat has also clarified through a statement China's stance is fair and above board. In order to evade its nuclear arms control responsibilities and pre create pretext for restarting nuclear tests, the United States is trying to scapegoat and vilify other countries. These practices will continue to damage its international image and credibility. We hope that the international community can guard against these practices and jointly urge the United States to cease and desist from its irresponsible practices and continue to implement the CTPT BTE provisions and reaffirm its moratorium on nuclear tests. In order to seek absolute security, the United States is dismantling international consensus and withdrawn from international treaties and is investing huge sums in modernizing its nuclear facilities and capabilities. The United States is destroying the strategic stability. These negative activities abound in its numbers, and this has all shown that. This is the root cause of the heightened nuclear risks in the world. China urges the United States to do some source searching instead of blaming others for its own failures. The United States should earnestly fulfill its special and primary responsibilities for nuclear disarmament and work more to maintain global strategic stability and maintain international peace and security. I thank you. In terms of the opaque and rapid buildup of China's nuclear arsenal, these are basically accusations. China has already responded to these accusations in our previous statements. I wish to point out that Germany, the Netherlands, and other countries, which are under the nuclear sharing arrangements of NATO, they, in disregard of nuclear consensus, are hyping up the so called three largest nuclear arsenal countries, and we are against these irresponsible, reckless uh rhetoric. China's nuclear forces. Are not at the same level with those countries that are in possession of the 90% of the nuclear arsenal. These fake rhetoric and narratives are aimed at creating pretexts for its allies and also to create excuses and deflect international attention from its participation in the nuclear sharing arrangements. Regarding nuclear sharing, China has consistently believed that the relevant arrangements are in violation of the spirit and provisions of the treaty. During this review conference, the non aligned movement countries and other states have expressed their challenge and doubts regarding the arrangements. China urged the relevant countries to heed the legitimate concerns of the countries in the international community. Thank you, Mr. Chair. Yeah.
Thank you, Chair. As the current president of the TPNW, South Africa deems it necessary to exercise a right of reply in view of the statements that continue to represent the treaty. While we recognize the sovereign right of each state to decide whether or not it would sign or ratify treaties that seek to establish higher international norms, we regret any attempts to undermine the TPNW and in particular what it endeavors to achieve. It is of concern that some Member States that advance the rules-based multilateral system work actively to undermine multilateral instruments that have been agreed upon by the majority of Member States. The TPNW represents the highest non-proliferation commitment any state can make. It allows the opportunity for those states that are not located in nuclear weapon-free zones to join an instrument that expresses their total opposition to nuclear weapons. Let us be clear. TPNW member states are state parties to the NPT and work actively towards the NPT's full implementation. The treaty is fully consistent with the NPT and endeavours to contribute towards fulfilling its provisions, including the obligation to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures towards nuclear disarmament. It neither distracts nor adds to the safeguards regime established under the NPT, nor excludes the further strengthening of that regime or the additional measures that states may undertake or have already committed to. As with the NPT, any state joining the treaty will be required as a minimum to conclude and implement a comprehensive safeguards agreement with the IAEA. The TPNW is an essential and effective measure to implement the NPT's disarmament obligations contained in Article VI. Just as the other pillars of the NPT rely on subsequent treaties to implement them, the NPT's disarmament pillar requires a prohibition norm for its implementation. Prohibitions of anti-personnel mines, biological weapons, and chemical weapons follow the same logic. The TPNW is therefore not only fully compatible with the NPT, but represents a concrete step to further its implementation on both nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation. TPNW states are all in good standing in the NPT. They actively invest in strengthening the multilateral regime and reinforcing the nuclear taboo. TPNW state parties have taken on additional obligations regarding nuclear weapons compared to the NPT, so as to further ensure that these inhuman weapons will never be used again or proliferated further. We hope to see a more constructive and engaging approach towards the TPNW and its state parties. Joining the TPNW is also consistent with Action 1 of the 2010 NPT Action Plan, which calls on all state parties of the NPT to pursue policies that are fully compatible with the treaty and the objective of achieving a world without nuclear weapons. At a time when nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation architecture is under increased strain, the TPNW represents a strong call for multilateral cooperation to address these urgent challenges. The TPNW is fully supportive of and consistent with existing multilateral nuclear disarmament and non proliferation regime and the principles of IHL and international law on human rights. Setting a prohibition norm. First, as a legal basis from which the actual elimination of these weapons is to be pursued is a well-established international practice. This was the case with other inhuman and indiscriminate weapons, such as the biological and chemical weapons, as well as anti-personnel landmines and cluster munitions. I thank you, Chair.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.