At the 2026 NPT Review Conference (27 April - 22 May), States parties will examine the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 2022, noting that, despite intensive consultations, the 2015 Review Conference and the 2022 Review Conference were not able to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document.
🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇯🇵 Japan, 🇦🇺 Australia, 🇰🇷 Republic of Korea
Председатель. Thank you, Mr. Chair. First of all, I would like to congratulate you on being elected, and I would like to you as assure you of the fact that the Russian delegation stands ready to assist you in any way possible. Mr. Chair, during the discussion we had, we heard numerous accusations against my country, a number of states, and an organization essentially made the them the core point of their statements, frequently giving them priority before agenda items. The impression is created that these delegations are not at all interested in nonproliferation um issues. This does not facilitate us in attaining the goals of the review conference and objectively leads us to undermining the review process. And I noticed in this context an unprofessional and aggressive statement made by the representative by the EU, which contained unacceptable and false insinuations about Russia. This means that once again that providing the EU with the right to speak at the review conference along with individual states is a mistake. Zaporosia NPP is a Russian nuclear facility. It came under Russian jurisdiction at the end of the referenda which took place in September 2022. This territory now is an inalienable part of the Russian Federation, as inalienable as Texas or Louisiana is part of the United States, or Savoie is part of France. Ukraine regularly is creating danger for the ZNPP. During their review conference, they had six strikes against it using drones and one artillery strike, a massive artillery strike against facilities which are there to ensure that the ZNPP is functioning. There were also strikes by the Ukrainian droners against other Russian NPPs in Smolenskursk and Baronez. There is pressure that being exert exerted on the staff of the Zaporozhye NPP who are doing their duties. If psychological terror is exerted on them, um uh threatening intimidation of their relatives become routine. None of this would have been possible without a political, material, and technical and moral support from NATO states. Let me underscore here that NATO and EU or their allies are responsible for Ukrainians' actions. All of these states must immediately cease any interaction with Kiev. As regards the statements made about the militarization of the Z NPP, there are no uh offensive weaponry there. The NPP is not being used for offensive activity against Ukraine. At the same time, the NPP does have the contingence of the National Guard to protect the staff. That's normal international practice. There is no international document which bans this kind of activity. Furthermore, IAA instruments when it comes to nuclear safety directly state that there is a need to undertake proper measures to protect uh an NPP. And we would like to reaffirm, for the benefit of all members of the conference, that my country intends to protect the Zaporozhye NPP from any attacks using any necessary means. fully in line with our domestic legislation and the international obligations. The nonproliferation issues of those countries who accuse us is uh is not blameless. They, for example, have members of the joint nuclear missions by NATO, in the course of which knowledge is being transferred which is necessary for the uh use of uh nuclear weapons or even its creation. Furthermore, on the territory of five countries or members of such missions, have on their territories foreign nuclear weapons, whereas they had say had signed uh comprehensive uh safeguards agreements. And the Agency is stating against um about those states uh stating that the nuclear materials on those countries is for peaceful activities. Well that's clearly out of line with what is actually happening. We also reject the accusations according to which the so-called extended nuclear deterrence is in line with the NPT. As regards our inter um interaction with DPRK, I would like to say that DPRK, unlike Ukraine, is not a threat to peaceful nuclear facilities, is not uh supporting those uh states which are involved in that kind of activity. Our cooperation with Pyongyang is being conducted fully in line with international commitments and is in no way impacting the subjects under discussions for NPT. We are concerned by the continued AUKUS partnership. We've heard affirmations that within this partnership no non nuclear states will not be given nuclear weapons. Yeah, blog
Mr. Chair, allow me to congratulate you, Ambassador, on your assumption of the Chair of Main Committee too. You may count on my delegation's full support and cooperation. Mr. Chair, our delegation wishes to exercise the right of reply regarding the unfounded allegation by one previous speaker against Japan. We reiterate that Japan observes its three non nuclear principles as policy guidelines. As a staunch supporter of the NPT, Japan has been advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This, of course, includes compliance with its own obligation under the NPT. Mr. Chair, all nuclear materials in Japan is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and is under exceptionally stringent IAEA safeguards, including the additional protocol, as evidenced by ongoing verification mechanisms, the number of areas subject to inspection, and the frequency of those inspections. The IAEA has drawn and continue to draw the broader conclusion that all nuclear material in Japan remains in peaceful activities. Therefore, there are no proliferation concerns regarding Japan. Japan continues to cooperate with the IAEA in a fully transparent manner. Moreover, Japan continues to uphold the principle of not possessing plutonium without specific purposes. Mr. Chair, since the end of World War II, Japan has been consistently maintained its path as a peace-loving nation, upholding freedom, democracy, and the rule of law, and contributing to international peace and prosperity. This remains unchanged. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
A warm thank you, Chair. I take the floor on behalf of the delegations of Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States to once again address misleading assertions which have been made in the preceding debate regarding Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program. Chair, it is unfortunate that delegations continue to repeat misleading assertions. I will not repeat the points we have made previously during the general debate. I will, however, address the additional factual inaccuracies we have heard today, that the transfer of high-enriched uranium from a nuclear weapons state to a non-nuclear weapons state is prohibited under the MPT and unprecedented in history. Chair, neither of these statements is true. The NPT does not prohibit the transfer of HEU, regardless of its enrichment level, as long as appropriate measures consistent with IAEA safeguards agreements are in place. As we have made clear, AUKUS partners are fully committed to the MPT, are complying with our respective obligations under it and other relevant instruments, and in undertaking this cooperation will set the highest non-proliferation standard. I thank you, Chair.
Thank you, Chair. We expressed our deep concern over the comments made by Russia. It is evident that the military cooperation between Russia and the DPRK, including the dispatcher of DPRK troops, constitutes a violation of international norms, including the UN Charter and relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolutions 1718, 1874, and 2270. Such cooperation seriously undermines peace and stability in the international community. We therefore urge Russia and the DPRK to immediately cease their unlawful military cooperation. As a permanent member of the UN Security Council that adopted numerous resolutions on the DPRK, and one of the countries that led the efforts to build the global non proliferation regime, Russia has a significant responsibility to uphold the integrity of the international nonproliferation architecture. We urge them to promptly put an end to such illegal activities. Thank you. I thank uh distinguished representative of the Republic of Korea for your statement. That was the last state to exercise its right of reply. Now uh Russia would like to exercise a second right of reply. Mikhail Yurich, slow one.
Thank you. I would like to point out that we are concerned by the continued and development in the AUKUS partnership under which it is provided not just cooperation on n nuclear propulsion. There is a great deal of other areas there. We have heard um assertions that within this partnership non-nuclear states will not be given nuclear weapons. We took note of that and are even ready to believe that this is not going to happen in the near future, nonetheless creating an infrastructure. A military infrastructure of nuclear states on the territory of a non-nuclear state does not allow us to be certain to that nuclear weapons will not appear that in future, if that will be deemed to be necessary by members of the partnership. We see that there is a threat to the non-proliferation regime and nuclear disarmament in the continued nuclearization of the Republic of Korea and Japan, and call upon these states to reject participation in the nuclear plans of NATO and introduce a ban on the presence of their territory, of nuclear weapons, and their delivery vehicles. We think that this would be a serious contribution towards uh the security in the Pacific region. Thank you.
Thank you, Chair, for giving me the floor. Our delegation would wishes to exercise the right of reply regarding the unfounded allegation by one previous speaker against Japan. I just would like to state that there is no specific consideration has been given to the introduction of nuclear powered submarines in our country. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.