At the 2026 NPT Review Conference (27 April - 22 May), States parties will examine the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 2022, noting that, despite intensive consultations, the 2015 Review Conference and the 2022 Review Conference were not able to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document.
🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇺🇦 Ukraine, 🇮🇷 Islamic Republic of Iran, 🇩🇪 Germany, 🇳🇱 Kingdom of the Netherlands, 🇬🇧 United Kingdom, 🇩🇰 Denmark, 🇮🇹 Italy
Thank you, Mr. President. I did not want to take the floor, but I do have a question. I have a question regarding the procedure. Do do we have the opportunity to exercise the right of reply after the last meeting, that is to say, this evening's meeting? But today the general debate will finish in the first half of the day. Can we exercise the right of reply upon the conclusion of the general debate, or do we need to wait? The second meeting of the day for the second meeting of the day. That is my question.
Thank you, Mr. President. Ukraine takes the floor in exercise of its right of reply to the statement delivered by the delegation of the Russian Federation yesterday. Ukraine firmly rejects their unfounded allegations regarding any supposed transfer of nuclear weapons or related components to Ukraine. Such claims are blatant disinformation aimed at undermining trust in Ukraine and its international partners. Ukraine remains fully committed to its obligations and commitments as a non-nuclear weapon state party to the NPT. Ukraine voluntarily renounced the world's third largest nuclear arsenal and joined the NPT in good faith. In return, Russia grossly violated its security assurances provided under the Budapest Memorandum. The Russian Federation attempts to portray itself as a responsible state party to the treaty. However, the facts clearly demonstrate otherwise. It's Russia that continues its aggression against Ukraine, a war that, among other crimes, created unprecedented risks to nuclear safety and security. Russia continues to ongoing attempts to shift responsibility into others. In reality, it's Russia's actions, including its nuclear blackmail, that erodes strategic stability and weakens the global non proliferation and disarmament architecture. In closing, we call on all NPT States party to unequivocally condemn. The Russian Federation unjustified and up unprovoked full scale invasion of Ukraine and to increase pressure on Moscow to cease its aggression and withdraw its forces from the territory of Ukraine within its internationally cognized border. I thank you.
Mr. President, my delegation categorically rejects and condemns the baseless and misleading allegations made by certain Western delegations, including the US, the UK, France, Germany, during this week's debate regarding Iran's peaceful nuclear program. I I must state the following with absolute clarity. First, Iran's nuclear program has always been, is, and will remain exclusively peaceful. This is not a matter of debate. It is a matter of fact, record, and verification. Those who pretend otherwise are deliberately spreading deception for political gain. Second, the real objective behind these accusations is no secret. To deny an NPT member state its inalienable right under Article 4 to the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Hiding behind hollow slogans such as Iran should never have nuclear weapons does not disguise this agenda. It merely exposes the hypocrisy of those who claim to defend the NPT while actively undermining its very foundation. Third, these same countries who lecture others on non proliferation watched silently as two nuclear armed states launched a bombing campaign against Iran's safeguarded nuclear facilities, targeting scientists and infrastructure under IAEA's oversight. Iran did not yield. Iran did not abandon its program. And Iran did not submit to aggression. Knowledge cannot be bombed away. And dignity cannot be terrorized into submission. Iran has paid a higher price for not building a weapon than others have paid for actually doing so. Yet it has neither capitulated nor pursued weaponization. It has instead continued its nuclear development transparently and peacefully under the IAEA safeguards. Fourth, what these countries consistently refuse to understand is the central pillar of Iran's nuclear policy dignity. Iran does not negotiate under threats, coercion, or selective and weaponized interpretation of international law. The JCPOA succeeded precisely because it acknowledged Iran's dignity. Recognize its right to enrichment and engage on the basis of mutual respect. That achievement collapsed not because of Iran, but because the United States unilaterally withdraw and Europe failed to uphold its commitments. Fifth, the representative of the US regime also spoke of good faith diplomacy. Such claims are not credible. They are absurd. The world has witnessed what this so-called diplomacy entails, negotiations in words, and use of force in practice. Two voice, while diplomatic engagements were ongoing, the US regime chose aggression over dialogue, attacking Iran and its safeguarded peaceful facilities. And in this very hall, it openly threatens further military and economic pressure. This is not diplomacy, it is coercient, plain and simple. If the US and certain Western states genuinely seek a path forward, they must abandon the failed strategy of pressure, intimidation, and distortion. A sustainable solution is possible only when Iran's rights are fully respected and when dignity, not coercion, forms the basis of engagement. Mr. President, my delegation will not take up the valuable time of this meeting to address matters outside the scope of this conference, and instead refers the representative of the League of Arab States to our right of reply delivered yesterday. My delegation wishes to recall that the historical and internationally recognized name of the waterway in our region is the Persian Gulf. The use of a fabricated name by the representative of the League of Arab States is not only inconsistent with established norms, but also reflects a disregard for the principles of good neighborliness and mutual respect. I thank you, Mr. President.
Thank you, Mr. President. Our delegation is compelled to once again take the floor in exercise of its right of reply because we must respond to the unsubstantiated accusations. that were voiced by the representatives of the collective West in this room. I will begin with the most objective one. The High Representative of France allowed himself to accuse Russia of conducting colonialist policies. What's most surprising is that this came out of the m mouth of the representative of France, a country whose colonial history uh runs red with blood and isn't involves killing millions of people on a number of continents. It appears that France still deeply regrets that thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union Whose successor the Russian Federation is. In the 1960s, the colonial era ended thanks to the efforts of the Soviet Union, and France had to accept the sovereignty of many states who for a hundred years had been subjected to the yoke of French colonialism. Now I will respond to those who accuse Russia of being noncompliant with the nonproliferation regime. We are fully compliant with our nonproliferation obligations. We make Individual efforts and participate in collective efforts to strengthen the global nonproliferation regime. Those who uh leverage such accusations against us are part of the NATO nuclear bloc, which has for many years been uh conducting nuclear sharing exercises. They have been using uh weapons deployed in Belgium, the Netherlands, Turkey, and other countries. These are nuclear weapons belonging to the Yes. We are More informed about the specifics of nuclear weapons than many others, and so we are not sure that these nuclear sharing arrangements do not involve the transference of sensitive nuclear technologies, which would violate the NPT. The ease with which a dozen NATO member states, including Germany, Denmark, the Netherlands, Poland, Finland, Sweden, and others, uh consider the option of participating in Pres President Macron's initiative to implement uh the Contexts, uh, the concept of advanced deterrence. That implementing that con uh concept would mean not only running the risk of French nuclear weapons spreading across the continent, but deepening nuclear military cooperation among those member states. This very concept of advanced deterrence has nothing to do with genuine deterrence, which is the foundation for maintaining strategic stability and uh The current balance of security. We come to this conclusion because the UK and France have announced their intent to build up their nuclear arsenals, which contradicts Article VI of the NPT, and it seems that they have already been practic begun to practically implement their nuclear plans. It is the permanent direct threat from NATO as well as plans to expand that nuclear blot that have led the leadership of the Russian Federation and the Republic of Belarus to take urgent and necessary measures to strengthen the security of their. States and their organization. Unlike the arsenals of Russia and the US in recent modern history, the arsenals of the UK or France were never placed under any limitations, verifications, or control. We have little specific data on its status, preparedness, and Uh the doctrines of the two countries say very little in this regard. We believe that the UK and France should be the first to accept the proposal of Donald Trump to begin multilateral negotiations regarding control over nuclear weapons and disarmament. Some delegations have said that Russia allegedly has the intention to place nuclear weapons in outer space. That is nothing more than misleading propaganda launched by the United States states it is completely baseless. The president of the Russian Federation, Vladimir Putin, has clearly and unequivocally Made it known that Russia has no such plans or intentions. The military outer space plans for NATO and the US are another thing entirely. They have declared outer space as a new arena for warfare. Back in 2019, President Macron publicly declared that France plans to place weapons based on various physics principles in outer space. The speaker has been cut off.
Thank you, Mr. President. Mr. President, my delegation listened carefully to concerns expressed with regard to extended deterrence and nuclear sharing during the general debate. Germany as a member of NATO would like to react to these concerns. In uh the reaction uh to the statement by Iran yesterday, my delegation has already underlined that nuclear deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements are in full compliance with the NPT. While the criticism with regard to these arrangements by Iran and a few other delegations seem to be mainly motivated to creating a scape coat to detract from their failures to comply with the treaty, and we just heard another example in the right of reply of the Russian Federation, my intervention today is meant to address delegations who express these concerns in good faith, motivated by a responsible approach to our treaty as the cornerstone of disarmament, non proliferation, and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. In doing so, I would like to recall some of the milestones of the NPT process. When the NPT was negotiated in the 60s, NATO and its arrangements for extended deterrence were already well established and working. Did they hinder negotiations and the conclusion of the NPT? The answer is no. When the review conferences in 2000 and 2010 Um uh negotiated major um outcome documents um uh between NPT states. NATO and its arrangements for extended deterrence were still a reality. Did they prevent consensus on major commitments like the thirteen practical steps on nuclear disarmament in 2000 or the 2010 action plan? Certainly not. To the contrary, NATO and its member states were actively contributing to the success. The same holds true for the major cuts in nuclear weapons in the framework of the bilateral disarmament agreements between the US and the Soviet Union and later Russia. Salt, start, new start were negotiated and implemented without NATO extended adherence presenting any obstacles. No. NATO extended deterrence and nuclear sharing arrangements never stood in the way of making progress, not with regard to nuclear disarmament, and not with regard to implement and strengthen the NPT. They have accompanied the NPT since its very beginning, contributing to its successes in all the three pillars. This has never changed and will not change in the future. No doubt there are challenges our treaty is facing, there are reasons for concern, but the real challenges our treaty is facing are different. Iran's long history of insufficient cooperation with the IEA, DPRK, a member state who clandestinely developed nuclear weapons, Russia, a nuclear weapon state and member of the Security Council invading Ukraine, a non nuclear weapon state, and finally a lack of transparency by China with regard to its nuclear build up. To strengthen the NPT, our conference will have to address these issues. Thank you, Mr. President.
Thank you, Chair. In reply to the allegations made by the distinguished representative of the Russian Federation, I would like to take the floor on NATO's extended deterrence arrangements. Such remarks should be seen for what they are a deliberate mischaracterization that not only distracts from our efforts to uphold the integrity and credibility of the MPT, but also undermines it. Let me put it clearly once more. NATO's extended deterrence arrangements are and have always been fully consistent with the MPT. In fact, these arrangements have been a key tool in preventing the spread of nuclear weapons and therefore actively contribute to the MPT's proliferation non proliferation objectives. Let me recall that over 60 years ago the MPT was negotiated, taking into account NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements, and that for decades no state party raised any objections. These arrangements have not changed since then. We are we are if we are serious about protecting the integrity of the treaty, let's not allow ourselves to be distracted from the worrying developments that actually challenge the MPT today. These include, amongst other things, Russia's war of aggression against Ukraine, accompanied by irresponsible nuclear rhetoric and coercion, China's rapid and opaque expansion of its nuclear arsenal, and Iran's long standing lack of cooperation with the IAA regarding its nuclear program and non proliferation obligations. Let me and let me also categorically reject the allegations, or should I call it, fantasies, of the distinguished Russian Federation with regard to the Franco Dutch strategic stability discussions. These are a follow up to the speech by President Macron and have nothing to do with the spread of nuclear weapons. Let me conclude by reiterating that NATO's allies long tracked record of doing their part on arms control and disarmament, including in the nuclear domain, and NATO's deep and long standing commitment to the MPT. That commitment remains unwavering, as does our dedication to the MPT as the cornerstone of the global non proliferation regime. Thank you, Chair.
Thank you, Mr. President. I am exercising the UK's right of reply to the statement just now by the Russian delegation. I would draw the Russian delegation's attention to the statement of the UK Minister of State earlier this week, in which he welcomed calls from the US for P five strategic stability talks. We regret that Russia, including in our most recent P5 meeting in Casablanca, has yet to do so. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. President. I had not intended to take the floor, but the Russian Federation statement on European nuclear deterrence makes it necessary. I can confirm that Denmark, as well as other close allies, has accepted an invitation from France to enter into a strategic cooperation on nuclear deterrence. The broader background for this cooperation was very eloquently presented by the French President Macron in his important and very balanced speech on Singlet of March this year. The defensive cooperation is intended to reinforce the defense of Europe and to strengthen European deterrence. The purpose is to contribute to maintaining peace, stability and security in light of the increasingly complex security situation, primarily caused by Russia's unprovoked and illegal invasion of Ukraine. As stated in the speech by President Macron, the cooperation is taking place in full compliance with our international obligations and particularly the NPT. Indeed, in increasing the security of Europe, The initiative provides significant benefits, including preventing proliferation. The NPT remains the cornerstone of the global non proliferation regime, and Denmark is and continue and will be fully committed to its obligations under the treaty. It goes without saying that Denmark's cooperation with France on nuclear deterrence is fully in line with our obligations under the NPT. Thank you, Mr. President.
Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Mr. President. I've asked the floor to exercise ISIL's right of reply in relation to affirmations made by some countries, including Iran and earlier the Russian Federation, on nuclear sharing arrangements. As usual, because we've done this many times, we reply that these um arrangements are fully consistent with both Articles 1 and 2 of the MPT, since the United States retains full cost custody and control. Over its nuclear weapons deployed in Europe. There has been no transfer, no transfer of nuclear weapons whatsoever. And Italy remains a non nuclear weapon state according to the NPT. These arrangements were known at the time of the negotiations of the NPT. In fact, in the NPT was negotiating taking into account NATO's nuclear sharing arrangements that were part of the general understanding on a new non proliferation treaty. And were discussed and accepted by the Soviet Union and then by other signatories. No one objected to these arrangements during the negotiations. No one objected to these arrangements upon signing and ratifying the treaty. No one objected to these arrangements for decades at each of the first nine review conferences. Then on 2015, Russia raised this issue for the first time a year after its illegal annexation of Crimea and the invasion of the eastern regions of Ukraine in 2014. And perhaps this is not a coincidence. Finally, a political historical consideration. Far from being in violation of the MPT, nuclear sharing arrangements have provided an element of stability to the MPT since its inception. Not only are they in full legal compliance with the MPT, they've also been for decades and remain beneficial to the MPT. And this is because they provide allies with security guarantees that reduce incentives for states to develop their own nuclear capabilities. And I think this is easy enough for everyone to understand. These arrangements remove incentives for countries under the umbrella to develop nuclear deterrence of their own. Nuclear sharing arrangements have prevented the nuclear proliferation. So they have contributed and still contribute to one of the treaty's main goals. I thank you, Chair.
Mr. President, we dedicate our second right of reply to address an issue that we believe is relevant to all NPT Member States. In this regard, we firmly reject the statement made by the representative of the U.S. regarding the so called non existence of the right to uranium enrichment. This assertion is legally unfounded and politically motivated. Article 4 of the NPT is explicit and unambiguous. It affirms the inalienable right of all state parties to develop research, production, and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination. Uranium enrichment is an intrinsic and indispensable component of the nuclear fuel cycle. To suggest that this right exists in theory, but that its most essential elements can be arbitrarily denied in practice is a clear distortion of the treaty. It is not interpretation, it is deception. The NPT does not list technologies one by one. It establishes principles, and the principle is unmistakable. Peaceful nuclear technology, including the the full fuel cycle, belongs to all state parties equally and without discrimination. Any attempt to reinterpret this provision to exclude enrichment is nothing more than an effort to rewrite the treaty through coercion and political pressure, not consent. In this context, I would like to remind the representative of the US that the United States itself has recognized the right to enrichment under the JCPOA. The position it is advancing today is therefore inconsistent with its own policy. Instead of distorting the clear and guaranteed rights of state parties under Article 4, the United States should clarify its position regarding Israel's nuclear weapons and its continued assistance to the Israeli regime in this regard before this conference. What is truly imaginary and illusory is the notion that one group of states can monopolize technologies while denying others their lawful rights under the guise of non proliferation. This approach replaces law with selectivity and undermines the balance of rights and obligations that sustain the treaty. The issue of the right up to enrichment under Article 4 of the NPT is not merely an issue for one country, but for all state parties. It directly affects the rights of all members of this treaty. We therefore believe that all estates present in this room should take note of the implications of the position expressed by the United States.
Спасибо, господар. Thank you, Mr. President. I will come back to the question that I raised earlier regarding the military outer space plans of the NATO bloc. I already mentioned that President Macron publicly declared in 2019 that France has plans to deploy weapons in space, weapons that are based on various principles of physics. And it is known that the U.S. in the near future will also be deploying. Means to intercept ballistic missiles in outer space, but those can have other uses as well. The military outer space projects of NATO are being actively implemented, and cutting edge technologies are used to this end. Outer space technology, quantum computing, artificial intelligence, all of this creates genuine threats to international security and has the most deleterious impact on global stability. I would like to recall that it was uh following the green light from the Collective West and NATO member states that the US in 2002 uh ex uh uh uh they uh d they left the ABM treaty, then subsequently they uh Ultimately undermined European security. It is Europe's fault that their security has essentially collapsed. Now, once again, about the NATO bloc, the nuclear bloc, members of which are building up their nuclear weapons stockpiles, are carrying out exercises regarding its use and are generally in agreement with the use of nuclear weapons. This is a nuclear bloc that creates a direct and deadly threat to its neighbors. It has carried out aggression against Yugoslavia, Iraq, Libya, and supported the aggression against Iran. That bloc cannot have any right. To be called to call itself a defensive block. And now, in response to the statement made by the distinguished representative of Ukraine, for many years we have been seeing Ukraine turn essentially into a platform being used by the collective West to carry out hostile actions against the Russian Federation. A direct threat was created to the safety and security of the Russian Federation. And now still the countries in Europe continue to support the regime in Kiev by providing it with financial and logistical support, including deadly weapons and uh other technology.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.