At the 2026 NPT Review Conference (27 April - 22 May), States parties will examine the implementation of the Treaty's provisions since 2022, noting that, despite intensive consultations, the 2015 Review Conference and the 2022 Review Conference were not able to reach agreement on the substantive part of the draft Final Document.
🇦🇺 Australia, 🇨🇳 China, 🇺🇸 United States, 🇱🇹 Lithuania, 🇮🇷 Islamic Republic of Iran, 🇷🇺 Russian Federation, 🇦🇪 United Arab Emirates, 🇯🇵 Japan
Thank you, Chair, and good afternoon. I wish to briefly take the floor to address unfortunate and misleading assertions which have been made in the debate this morning by the Russian Federation regarding Australia's naval nuclear propulsion program. Chair, as we have consistently stated, Australia's acquisition of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. And accompanying infrastructure in Australia is fully consistent with our international non proliferation obligations, including under the NPT and the South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, also known as the Treaty of Raratonga. The Raratonga Treaty does not prohibit the acquisition or operation of conventionally armed nuclear powered submarines. The treaty is focused on the prohibition of the manufacture or acquisition of nuclear explosive devices. AUKUS has nothing to do with nuclear explosive devices. Australia will not acquire and does not seek nuclear weapons. The rotation of US and UK nuclear powered submarines at HMAS Stirling in Western Australia under AUKUS is consistent with Australia's long standing bipartisan policy of having no foreign bases on its soil. All activities will be consistent with this policy. Australia is making transparent investments in defence capabilities that will enable us to make a credible contribution to strategic balance and stability in the region. Thank you very much, Jeff.
Mr. Chair, having heard the lame defense offered by certain countries on the issue of AUKUS at the main committee two, the Chinese delegation believes further elaboration on our position on this matter is in order. AUKUS is a textbook case of nuclear proliferation. It is by no means a project of cooperation for the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in its traditional sense. For starters, the IAEA's current safeguard system cannot ensure that Australia would not divert the relevant nuclear material for the manufacture of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. The AUKUS safeguards differ fundamentally from the hundreds of safeguards projects implemented by the IAEA since its inception. U.S. nuclear submarine Reactors are loaded with over two hundred kilograms of weapons grid enriched uranium fuel with an enrichment level of 93 to 97%, and have a design life of up to 33 years. That means that in the future, tons of weapons grade HEU will remain beyond the reach of the IAA's physical inventory verification or PIV for short for decades to come. And the IEA will lose continuity of knowledge of vast quantities of controlled. Nuclear material. Second, the safeguards issues AUKUS has given rise to are more contentious and challenging than ever before at the political, legal, procedural, and technical levels and cannot be put to bed by a mere verbal commitment to, quote, the highest non-proliferation standards, unquote. Any new safeguards arrangements negotiated between the three countries and the IAEA Secretariat without the full participation and consensus of the wider membership inherently lack representation and are said to cause division among member states with far reaching negative implications for the IAEA safeguard system and indeed the MPT regime. Last but not least, AUKUS has the effect of provoking other countries to follow suit as it sets a dangerous precedent that seriously undermines regional peace and stability. The US has given the green light, and that glaringly, to two of its allies in the Asia Pacific to develop nuclear powered submarines. It only makes more salient the increasingly pressing challenges posed by the transfer of nuclear material and the safeguards issues arising from nuclear submarine cooperation between military allies. The very existence of AUKUS is also in breach of the objectives and purposes of the Treaty of. Rarotonga and undermines the efforts of ASEAN countries to establish a nuclear weapon free zone in Southeast Asia dispensed to stir up block confrontation and provoke an arms race. Thank you, Chair.
Chair. I will not respond to the wholly unsupported assertions regarding U.S. actions in Iran as we are addressing those currently in Main Committee three, and I would respond to the um overheated comments on AUKUS as my Australian colleague already has. However, I am responding to the criticisms from the Russian Federation. Russia accuses the United States of undermining the nonproliferation regime. Yet has itself continued to deepen its cooperation with the DPRK. This should concern anyone committed to the NPT. We are disappointed but unsurprised that Russia continues to offer excuses and unpersuasive justifications for the DPRK's actions and, moreover, seeks to thwart the international community's efforts to respond to the DPRK's defiance of its UN Security Council resolution obligations. We are also disappointed by the Russian Federation's baseless claims about the application of IAEA safeguards. State-level safeguards approaches have been a standard part of safeguards implementation since 2002 when the IAEA Board of Governors took note of the conceptual framework for integrated safeguards. These efforts began with the clear recognition, beginning in the 1990s, that a strengthened safeguard system was needed following developments that came to light showing that the safeguard system as implemented previously had been exploited and was at risk of being further exploited by would be proliferators. Efforts to second guess the IAEA Secretariat's work are thinly veiled attempts to politicize safeguards and would turn back the clock on the agency's strides in seeking to verify that states' declarations are correct and complete. I would also like to address some delegations' misconceptions on NATO nuclear burden sharing and extended deterrence arrangements. Under Article I of the NPT, nuclear weapon states are not allowed to transfer nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices. Or control over such weapons or explosives directly or indirectly. Under the same article, nuclear weapon states may not assist, encourage, or induce any non nuclear weapon states to manufacture or otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, or control over such weapons or explosive devices. None of these prohibitive activities are occurring within U.S. extended deterrence arrangements or NATO nuclear burden sharing. None. And the same applies to our AUKUS agreement with our allies. To suggest these arrangements are illegal or even contrary to the spirit of the NPT is entirely lacking in any foundation. Indeed, as we have frequently stated, the U.S. maintains full custody and control of our nuclear weapons. Moreover, these arrangements do not encourage, but rather discourage nuclear proliferation. Supporting the objectives of the NPT. And the pillar that we are here the pillar that we are here to discuss. Thank you.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. I would like to address several points raised during the committee debate. I would like to respond to the statements that have questioned the legality of NATO, extended deterrence, and nuclear sharing arrangements. NATO nuclear policy is longstanding, predates the MPT, fully respects Articles one and two of the treaty, and remains unchanged. Any contention to the contrary is legally and factually incorrect. NATO nuclear sharing arrangements do not entail the transfer, sharing, or receipt of nuclear weapons or nuclear explosive devices. Full control over all nuclear arsenals remains exclusively with NATO three nuclear weapon states, and as many countries already stated, these facts are well established and should remain the basis of any discussions on these issues further. Chair, we have all heard Russia make false claims asserting that the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant is a Russian nuclear facility under Russian jurisdiction. Lithuania categorically rejects and will not recognize any attempts to legitimize Russia's illegal occupation of the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant. Any assertion that the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant has been transferred to the jurisdiction of the Russian Federation is legally null and void, has no validity under international law, and cannot produce any legal consequences. To recall a general principle of law that illegal act cannot produce legal rights for the benefit of the lawbreaker, this principle imposes an active duty of non recognition on all states. And on Russia Federation claims that cooperation with the DPRK is legal. What is described as legal cooperation in reality includes arms transfer and the sharing of proliferation-sensitive technologies. Such activities constitute clear violation of multiple UN Security Council resolutions. And this has also been confirmed by the latest findings of the Multilateral Sanctions Monitoring Team. It bears recalling that the Russian Federation, in its capacity as a permanent member of the Security Council, itself adopted these resolutions. I thank you, Chair.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation has already addressed over the past days the unfounded allegations against the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program. I will therefore not revisit those points. Instead, I wish to respond to the assertions made by the United States and certain Western delegations, including the UK, France, and Germany, regarding their so called commitment to a diplomatic solution. A review of record demonstrates that this claim does not withstand scrutiny. First, in October 2003, following intensive negotiations with the three European countries, Iran concluded the Sadobad Agreement. Under this arrangement, Iran voluntarily suspended uranium enrichment and implemented the additional protocol as a confidence-building measure. In good faith and with the expectation of reciprocal action. However, this process ultimately collapsed due to the failure of the European parties to honor their commitments, shifted the goalpost by demanding a permanent suspension and under pressure from the US, pursued referral of Iran's peaceful nuclear file to Security Council. Instead of recognizing Iran's legitimate rights, they sought the complete cessation of activities explicitly permitted under the treaty. Second, the JCPOA in 2015 marked another demonstration of Iran's commitment to diplomacy. Iran fully implemented its obligation, as repeatedly verified by the IAEA. Nevertheless, the United States unilaterally withdrew from the agreement and initiated a so called maximum pressure campaign. Third, open the return of the current United States administration for a second term, renewed claims were made regarding an interest in reaching an agreement. Iran once again engaged seriously. However, this process quickly revealed a lack of genuine intent. Instead of constructive engagement, the US and the Israeli regime resorted to acts of aggression, twowise within less than one year, targeting Iran and its peaceful nuclear facilities during ongoing negotiations, thereby betraying diplomatic efforts. Fourth, despite the unlawful attack of June 2025, Iran once again chose the path of diplomacy and reached an agreement with the IAEA in Cairo. This was yet another demonstration of Iran's commitment to engagement. Yet, rather than supporting this effort, certain Western countries choose to reward the attackers and punish diplomacy through the unlawful invocation of the snapback mechanism. Mr. Chair, despite all of the above, including acts of aggression against its territory and peaceful nuclear facilities, Iran remains committed to diplomacy. However, negotiation cannot succeed if one side merely pays lip service to dialogue and diplomacy while in practice advancing unrealistic and unlawful demands. At this very conference, all delegations heard coercive and legally unfounded assertions by the representative of the U.S. regarding the imaginary right to enrichment. Such a position runs counter to the inhalable rights of state parties under the Article 4 of the NPT and constitutes a central obstacle to meaningful progress. This statement has made clear to the international community that it is the imposition of unlawful and unreasonable demands by the United States and certain Western delegations that continues to obstruct the path toward a credible and sustainable diplomatic solution for Iran's peaceful nuclear program. Negotiations cannot succeed if the very rights enshrined in the treaty are denied. I thank you, Mr. Chair. Yeah.
Thank you very much. I would like to note that we listened to Australia's statement regarding the fact that AUKUS is not in contravention of Australia's obligations under the NPT. Given that within the framework of the system, nuclear weapons are not being transferred. We listened to the US's statement as well. Which spoke to the fact that extended deterrence and nuclear sharing are not at odds with the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty because in the framework of these mechanisms, nuclear materials are neither transferred nor accepted, or rather received. We listened to these statements and uh duly took note of them. What I will say is that these statements do nothing to allay concerns about the fact that in Australia military infrastructure of nuclear states is being set up. infrastructure within the framework of which a nuclear weapon could appear at any moment whenever the states in question deem this to be necessary. Furthermore, the statement regarding nuclear testing and extended deterrence do nothing to allay our concerns about the fact that these weapons on the territory of which there is there are nuclear weapons, whether temporarily or permanently They're not uh getting an extended conclusion from the IAEA. These uh findings are not in keeping with reality. We have no certainty about the fact that within the framework of that cooperation, knowledge is not being transferred that could be used to develop or acquire a nuclear weapon. Rest assured, the Russian Federation's cooperation with the DPRK in no way, shape, or form relates to the NPT. Within the framework of that cooperation, nuclear material is not being transferred. That's a certainty. This cooperation Is or does possibly actually strengthen the NPT because it reduces the sentiment of isolation in the DPRK and therefore disincentivizes the expansion of uh or the development of nuclear arsenals. Thank you. Chair, I thank the Distinguished Representative of the Russian Federation.
Mr. Chair, the United Arab Emirates would like to exercise the right of reply vis-a-vis the intervention of the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran in the morning session. The UAE rejects uh Iran's attempt to reduce or undermine the concerns or to depict the picture that they are outside the concern of this conference and the three main committees. Issues pertaining to safeguards, transparency, and cooperation with IAA are within the essence of the non proliferation regime. A claim. That what uh the UAE has uh put forward does not uh require a response. It does not undermine the fact that there are existing concerns when it comes to Iran's commitment in the safeguards area. And this does not build confidence. It actually asserts that we need full cooperation and transparency with the IAE in this regard. Mr. Chair, this the United Arab Emirates. says that uh speaking of Iran's nuclear file is relevant to non-proliferation and safeguards. Any peaceful nuclear program needs to have the characteristics, namely transparency, full cooperation, and the nuclear program of any state cannot be seen in separation from its aggressive policies that threaten the stability of its neighbors. Hence their nuclear program will become more of a threat when it's linked to escalation at the regional level and interference in the internal affairs of countries and arming militia and threatening critical facilities. Hence linking their nuclear activity to their regional behavior is a prerequisite. And this is part of the security environment of nuclear programs. The international community cannot ignore the wider context when all these question marks are in place. We call upon Iran not to distract attention from serious matters and to address technical and legal issues seriously. The road to building trust is clear. Ending aggression, full compliance, total transparency, and cooperation with the IA without conditions and responsible regional behavior that respects countries' stability, security, and sovereignty, I think. Yeah.
Mr. Chair, I'd like to exercise my right of reply in response to the statement made by the Japanese delegation. Japan has long advocated for a nuclear weapon free world, yet in reality it shelters safely under the U.S. nuclear umbrella. It constantly strengthens extended deterrence, pursues nuclear sharing, and has repeatedly issued dangerous statements about acquiring its own nuclear weapons. For years, Japan has produced and stockpiled plutonium far exceeding its actual civilian nuclear energy needs. This makes it a non-nuclear weapon state capable of extracting weapons-grade plutonium. Furthermore, several former Japanese political figures have publicly claimed that Japan possesses the ability to manufacture nuclear weapons. This demonstrates that Japan has both the strong intention and the solid conditions required to arm itself with nuclear weapons, severely challenging international nuclear non-proliferation regime. This year marks the 80th anniversary of the Tokyo trials. Japanese right-wing forces still refuse to reflect on the country's history of aggression and war crimes. Instead, they are pushing to accelerate Japan's remilitarization, seeking powerful offensive weapons, and relaxing restrictions on the export of lethal arms. Japan's surging new militarism has become a growing threat, threatening regional peace and stability while challenging the post-war international order. Should Japan acquire nuclear weapons under these circumstances, it would only compound the danger and destructive potential. China calls on Japan to do serious soul searching, earnestly fulfill its treaty obligations, and strictly abide by its three non nuclear principles. Japan must commit not to seek nuclear weapons in any form, cease its provocative policies and actions, and take concrete actions to promote rich strategic stability, regional peace, and security. I thank you, Mr. Chair. Yeah.
Thank you, Mr. Chair. Our delegation wishes to exercise the right of reply regarding the unfounded allegation which was made by a previous speaker. As I have stated before in this chamber, we Japan observe its three non nuclear principles as policy guidelines. As a staunch supporter of NPT, Japan has been. Advocating for the implementation of all its provisions. This, of course, includes compliance with its own obligation under the NPT. All nuclear material in Japan is used exclusively for peaceful purposes and is under exceptionally stringent IAEA safeguard, including additional protocol. Therefore, there is no proliferation concern regarding Japan. Since the end of World War II, Japan has consistently maintained its path as a peace loving nation. Upholding freedom, democracy, and rule of law, and contributing to international peace and prosperity. This remains unchanged. In this regard, Japan would like to point out that the working paper number 64, submitted by a certain country, contains unsubstantiated claims and numerous errors. I would like to remind all of you of the importance of the INFCIRC/549 549. mechanism for the severe plutonium management and of the fact that the same state has ceased to implement it in twenty seventeen. This is causing a serious lack of transparency. Thank you very much, Mr. Chair.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.