First Committee, 10th plenary meeting - General Assembly, 80th session
General debate on all disarmament and international security agenda items
Thematic discussion on specific subjects and introduction and consideration of all draft resolutions and decisions submitted under agenda items (from 90 to 106)
A/C.1/80/L.1, A/C.1/80/L.2
A/C.1/80/L.11, A/C.1/80/L.12, A/C.1/80/L.13, A/C.1/80/L.16
Rights of reply
2 replies by 2 delegations
🇰🇵 Democratic People's Republic of Korea, 🇷🇺 Russian Federation
🇰🇵 Democratic People's Republic of KoreaSecond replyin response to United States, United Kingdom, Australia, Switzerland
Thank you, Mr. Chair. My delegation is compelled to take the floor to exercise the right of reply in response to provocative statements made by the delegations of the US, the UK, the EU, Australia, and Switzerland. We categorically reject the stereotypes and absurd accusations against the DPRK as they are intended to mislead the international community and evade the responsibility for the deterioration of the tension on the Korean peninsula. As we have stated on several occasions, DPRK's possession of nuclear weapons is an exercise of sovereign right to self-defense against the persistent nuclear threats from the United States lasted for several decades. Even today, the objective security situation on and around the Korean Peninsula is renewing one waste record after another. At present, various forms of bilateral and multilateral road rails targeting the DPRK are taking place simultaneously and continuously, involving an ever growing nuclear elements. Under such circumstances, it is a realistic and inevitable requirement for the DPRK to rapidly and decisively strengthen its deterrent capabilities in order to counter the military threats posed by the United States and its allies. Our nuclear deterrent serves as a crucial factor in maintaining peace and the balance of power in the region. The double standards of labeling the DPRK's self-defensive nuclear deterrent as illegitimate, while justifying US nuclear build-up for hegemony as lawful and regular will never be accepted by the DPRK. The DPRK will always as firmly adhere to the line of strengthening its nuclear force, fully contain the threats and blackmail of the United States and its allies through all available political and military means, and ultimately achieve its strategic goals in a thorough and perfect manner. Mr. Chair. As stated before several times, the friendly cooperation between DPRK and Russian Federation is just and legal. It completely meets the words and spirit of treaty on comprehensive strategic partnership between DPRK and Russian Federation, as well as international laws including UN TATO. Thank you, Mr. Chair.
🇷🇺 Russian FederationFirst reply
Mr. Chairman, it is my duty to react to the provocative statements delivered by a number of Western countries in the context of the Russian-Belarus cooperation in the military nuclear sphere. In fact, a destabilizing policy in this area has already been carried out for a number of years, precisely by NATO countries. NATO, which has proclaimed itself to be a nuclear alliance, over decades. Members of the alliance have had practiced and continue to this day to develop so-called joint nuclear missions. This practice is rooted in U.S. nuclear weapons, which are deployed in six military facilities in five countries on the European continent, of which the United States is not a part. Nuclear weapons, which Washington holds in operating bases thousands of kilometers from its national territory and which it is actively modernizing, are capable of being promptly deployed to target a broader range of strategic goals on the territory of the Russian Federation and Belarus. Furthermore, there is no concealment of the fact that these are the goals which are being pursued during the relevant drills with the use of the second echelon of NATO countries, which provide for air escorts and cover for U.S. nuclear weapon delivery platform. At the same time, almost all members of the Alliance are engaged directly in the planning for the use of nuclear weapons. Recently, NATO has activized the development of schemes and potentials for joint nuclear missions. Specifically, the geography of nuclear weapons presence of the US and Europe is being expanded, and that of a number of countries which have been delegated to deliver U.S. special munitions to goals. This factor is particularly significant presently, where Russia has to take into account a significant escalation of threats linked to the West policy of inflicting upon our country a strategic defeat, which is fraught with a risk of direct to military confrontation of nuclear powers. Our closest allies in Belarus are also. Experiencing NATO's glow growing military political pressure, including uh with the efforts of countries directly bordering the Union states, some of whom have long been seeking to deploy part of the U.S.'s nuclear arsenal on their territory. We have long exercised restraint. For years we sought to persuade Washington to follow our example and to bring all of its n nuclear weapons back to their national territory. This was in vain, so we have to do something else. The response measures undertaken by Russia and Belarus are necessary and reciprocal in nature. They are adopted strictly in line with the deterrence approach, and they are calibrated and they are not at all commensurate with the steps undertaken by NATO, which are being carried out on the territory of the two uh fraternal countries in the uh who have put uh are part of a single defense space. Uh uh the consideration of uh the decision taken by Russia and Belarus jointly in nuclear uh in the nuclear sphere is uh is uh linked to the U.S. and NATO's uh pernicious policy as it seeks to undermine our security. And uh uh there's a need to remove uh U.S. nuclear weapons from Europe and to eliminate the relevant infrastructure. In connection with the joint nuclear missions, we note the following. We understand the willingness of a number of non-nuclear NPT member states to develop jointly with nuclear weapon states to develop a standalone universal agreement which contains legally binding negative security assurances. At the same time, we cannot universally consider all non-nuclear weapon states as countries that have justification to legitimately claim such guarantees. Specifically, Russia does not see compelling reasons to include in this category those formal non nuclear weapon states who directly or indirectly are engaged in the deeply destabilizing practice of NATO's joint military missions. Thank you for your attention. Yeah.
Verbatim from the transcript. A reply is identified from its own words, the Chair's grant, or its place in the right-of-reply sequence; delegations and addressees follow the transcript's attribution.
Speaking timeChair (10%) · Nigeria (4.7%) · South Africa (4%) + 35 more · Unattributed (14.2%)